Materialist Philosophy of Mind

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A paper that analyzes the materialist philosophy of the mind using various philosophers' point of views.

By examining the views of several philosophers, including Gilbert Ryle and Sigmund Freud, the paper analyzes materialist philosophy of the mind in the context of Cartesian dualism. The paper concludes that despite their minor differences on matter of details, the behaviorist, the functionalists, and theory cbest passing essay of identity are all agreed on the more materialist claim that the mental supervenes on the physical and that their disagreements arise over exactly how such supervenience obtains.

Arguing against Ryle logical behaviorism which is inclined more towards private and subjective mental states in the form of radical behaviorism, there is an identity theory of mind, which says that mental events are physical-biological processes in the brain. Pain for example is nothing over and above a neural state in the central nervous system, presumably the excitation of certain neurons in the brain. The identity can also be put in terms of properties of event; the property of being a pain event is identical with the property of being a c-fiber stimulation event. The identity theory of mind is believed to be the most preferred and most plausible view in contemporary philosophy of mind. To put it simple the identity theory suggests that to have a mind is to have a brain.

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